A major issue in the study of American politicsis the extent to which electoral discipline also constrainsbureaucrats. Inpractice.executive agenciesoperate with considerable independence from elected of cials. However,the entire process of policy execution isa game among legislators.the chief executive. and bureaucraticagents. Itincludes the initialdelegation of authority. the choice of policy alternatives,and opportunities for oversight and control. A simple model of this process demonstrates an important distinction between bureaucratic authority and bureaucratic discretion. Indeed.initssimplest form, the model predicts a world in which bureaucrats are the sole active participants inpolicyrnaking, but inwhich the choice of policy is traceable entirely to the preferencesof elected of cials. More realistically. the model leads to a precise de nition of agency discretion. These conclusions have practical applications for both students and reformers of policymalting.
ies argue that the decisions of federal agencies directly reflect the wishes of elected of cials inCongress and the White House (Mayhew, 1974,pp. 106- 40; Arnold, 1979, pp. 207-10; Fiorina, 1981;  Moe, 1985; Calvert, Moran, and Weingast, 1988) . In this view, elected of cials gain leverage over bureaucrats through informal oversight, using such tools as decentralized information gathering (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Weingast, 1984; Aberbach, 198?) and carefully structured administrative procedures (McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987) to guarantee that the relevant legislative constituents are well served.
We address this unresolved issue with a simple modelof the policy process. Implicitinthe structure of decision makingcreatedbythe Constitution isa game that pitsthe ambitions of institutional actors against one another. Inparticular, the process of policy execution is a game among legislators, the chief executive, andbureaucraticagents;it includesthe initialdelegation of authority, the choice of policy alternatives, and opportunities for oversight and control. The actions of political of cials throughout this process jointly determine policy outcomes. Our aim is to examine the sequence of decisions made by elected representatives and bureaucrats, to explore the strategies available to them, and to assess the policy outcomes that result.
As our analysis demonstrates, the fact that bureaucratic agents appear to make policy with little direct input from elected officials does not necessarily imply that bureaucrats are responsible for policy choices or that they employ meaningful "discretion." Bureaucratic choice is embedded in a game in which the appointment power of the executive and legislature, together with the threat of sanctions, providesa potentially decisive in uence over policy. Inits simple form, this games equilibrium has two important properties. First, bureaucrats are the sole active participants inpolicymaking. Second, however. the actual choice of policy is traceable not to bureaucratic preferences but to the preferences of legislative and executive politicians.
This approach also leads us to a precise de nition of agency discretion. The simple game whose outcome we have just described is relevant when politicians possess suf cient information about the preferences and beliefs of appointees, or suf cient willingness to oversee agency decision making. When the information is poor and the willingness is lacking, there isroom for agency discretion. Discretion consists of the departure of agency decisions from the positions agreed uponby the executive andlegislature at the time of delegation and appointment. Thus even though the agency may be the sole active decision maker, policy outcomes are traceable to the preferences of all three institutions and to the constitutional process in which they act.
A further implicationof this approachisthe followingcomparative statics result: allelse equal, the more important a policy area to politicians,the lower the amount of agency discretion. This follows because inthose areas in which they care the most, politicians will expend greater effort and resources inreducingthe uncertainty that affordsbureaucrats the opportunity for discretion.
Beyondthese theoretical issuesindemocraticpolitics,our study hastwo important practical applications. First, any attempt to improve policy outcomes systematically through structural or procedural reform depends on a sophisticated understanding of where the relevant policy decisions are made. If,for example,thelegislature isprimarilyresponsible for the content of policy outcomes, then no amount of reform of the bureaucratic process is going to make much difference, and "improvements" inthe oversight capabilities of the legislature will just enhance existing tendencies. Second, empirical The stages in our game are as follows; each stage is justified and analyzedbelow. First,the legislature and executive determine the agent's preferencesina Nashbargainingprocess (Nash, 1950) .The threat point for this process is the "no decision" outcome. Second,the chosen agent picksa policyx. Third, the legislature and executive decide simultaneously whether to exercise their veto powers. Then the players receive their payoffs, and the game ends. For reasons that will be apparent, we take up these stages inreverse order.
The Veto Stage
The veto stage represents the ability of a real world legislature or executive to prevent an agency's decision from taking effect, but only at the 'Whatever the bargaining process, there isno reason for the executive and legislature to settle on an agent ideal point off their contract curve. since they could both be made better off by locating at some point on the contract curve. they should never agree on a point on the curve but beyond the segment between their ideal points. Hill(1985) andHammond. Hill. and Miller (1986) These choices are illustrated in Figure 1 .4
The Appointment Stage
Finally,we arrive at the rst stage of the game, inwhich the legislature and executive engage in a Nash bargaining game over the type of agent to appoint.5 Their payoffs from appointingan agent with idealpointx,are the payoffsthey would receive from the policyprocessgiventhe optimal behavior of an agent with that ideal point inthe policy decision stage, and given their own subsequent optimal behavior in the veto stage. The "threat point,"the payoff from failing to reach any agreement onthe appointment, ' We have modeled this as a one-shot affair, but similar results can be obtained from a repeated-game version. See Appendix A. is zero for each player. The "negotiation set," that is, the set of agent ideal points that are Pareto optimal for the legislature and executive and make both of them better off than the threat point, is the interval [max {(1, 1 -v,},min{1, v,e_}] . In a comparative statics sense, any shift in v, or P; has a straightforward effect on x: for a unit increase in v; or a unit decrease in v,, there will be a 1.'2-unit increase in the nal location of x. More generally, in a multidimensional policy space, any shift in the executive's or legislature's ideal point means a correspondingshift inthe locationof their contract curve,and thus in the appointed agent's ideal and the policy outcome.
Thus in the basic model, the legislature and executive have complete control over the policyoutcome through their bargainingprocessinappointingthe agent. Active monitoringand control of the agency's decisions plays no role. Of course, there is more to the real world process of policymaking than this; inparticular,the players' uncertainty at every stage of the process is a key feature, to which we turn in the next section. But in all our subsequent development of the model, the appointment stage remains as the initial control over agency decisions, and policy outcomes continue to re ect the bargain struck between the two elective branches of government.
Uncertainty and Agency Discretion
The conclusions of the basic model result directly from the assumption that the executive and legislature have perfect information. Imperfect information could arise at many points in the process. The elected authorities might not know exactly the true preferences of the agent. Indeed, policymaking by an agency often starts with the gathering of information about the policy problem to be addressed, information presumably not known to the elected authorities at the time of the appointment. It 
Direct Legislation
Any power delegated to an agency can always be taken back again. If some policy is desired, the alternative to leaving the agency's decision in placeisfor the legislaturetolegislatedirectly,subject to executiveapproval. Inthe terms of the basic model, we could replace the veto power with the ability of the legislature and executive to override the agency's decision through direct legislation. Then the terms v, and V( become the utility attached by those two players to having the agency make the decision for them, rather than having to do it themselves, possibly with some delay or likelihood of deadlock.
If this is the only way that the elected authorities can alter an agency decision, it will be invoked only ifit liesoutside the contract curve between the executive and legislature. Otherwise, one of them is sure to be made worse off bythe result.If v,, > 1or vg > 1,the boundsmaybeevenwider, since some agency actions will not be worth correcting.
The result of direct legislation should be very much like the process of appointment. Now, only the legislature can propose laws, while the executivecan sign or veto them. But again (as inAppendix B),the repeatedinteraction between the executive and legislature should prevent the legislature from having all the bargainingpower,just as it prevents the executive from having it in the appointment process. Again the NBS provides a reasonable guess about the outcome. Hence, the result of direct legislation should be preciselyx;-just what the electedauthoritiesintendedinthefirst place. If the payoffs from direct legislation, u.{x.} and ug{x,}, are incorporatedintothe v, and v;terms, the result issimilar to that of the basicmodel.
Alternative Powers of Political' Control
After-the-fact controlsover agency actioninrealgovernmentsaresome complicatedcombinationof the alternatives modeledhere. A morerealistic model incorporating them all would be dif cult to work with; yet from the results presented here, it is clear that the general outline of our conclusions from the simple model in the rst section remain inforce. Through the appointment process,the elected authoritiesplay acritical roleindetermining the ultimate policy outcome, more so if their guesses about the appointee's true preferences are fairly accurate. The threat of ex post action by the elected authorities providesa measure of latent control over the agent's actions. The most active oversight and control will be reserved for those instances, rare under conditionsof fairly extensiveinformationandmorecommon when uncertainty is high, when the agency most surprises its political masters.
Finally,the executive and the legislature may have different abilities to affect agency decision making after the delegation and appointment. Our analysisindicatesthat when members of one branchknow that their abilities to discipline agencies after the fact areweaker than the abilitiesof the other branch, they will insist on appointments and procedural features beforethe fact that tend to compensate for these differences.
Discussion
The issue of political control of bureaucratic decision making has spawned a large literature focusing onthe question of whether the electoral constraintsfaced bypoliticians extendto the decisionsmadebybureaucrats. Our model addresses this issue by separating the in uences of elected representatives and bureaucratic decision makers andidentifyingtheir distinct contributions toward policy outcomes. The various modi cations of our basic model indicate that, although stylized, the model captures the essence of the game that would hold as well in more complex, specialized, and realistic models. ' The most important result of our analysisisitsdemonstrationof therole of the appointment process inin uencing ultimatepolicy choices. Inapplyingour model, the "appointment" stage should be taken to includeany actions that the executive or legislature can take, prior to agency choice, that in uence the later goals of the agent or the set of feasible choicesavaiiable to the agency. Such actions include the structuringof the agency itself, the denominationof itspowers and jurisdiction, the speci cation of administrative procedures to be followed, and the type of personnel with which the agency is to be staffed (lawyers, economists, engineers, generic civil servants, etc. (Noll,1971; Calvert andWeingast, 1982 Suppose that the basic game isplayed in nitely many times insuccession,with all players learning the outcome of the previous play before proceeding to the next. Future payoffs are discounted by multiplication by a discount factor IS. A player's total payo f for the repeated game is the sum of these discounted payoffs over all plays. This method of repetition is the same as employed by Axelrod (1981) .
Tokeepthis relatively brief.we restrict our attentiontothe case where x,is inthe interval [0, 1] . Also. we require it,and u;to be continuous and single peaked, and u,(O) and ug (1) Although we have no noncooperative-garne criterionfor decidingwhich of the in nity of equilibria the playersinthis appointment game mightsettle on,intuitiontells usthat the results are likely to be appointments somewhere inthe ''middle'' of the no-veto interval. One appealingobjective criterion for identifyingsuch pointsisthe Nashbargainingsolution (NBS) (Nash, 1950) .Herewe take theview that the axiomsde ning theNBSarecriteriafor agoodprediction technique for bargainingoutcomes,ratherthan criteria for a "fair arbitrationscheme," asthey are sometimes presented (e.g.. Luce and Raiffa, 1957) . For present purposes the particular choice of a bargainingpredictionmethodisinconsequentialprovided that it iscentrallylocated and responds to the relative bargaining positions of the players.
